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THREE WORLD WARS: AUSTRALIA AND THE GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS 
OF TWENTIETH CENTURY WARS 
David Lowe 
On 21 June 1950 Australia's top defence planning body, the Council of Defence, 
assembled in Canberra for conference with Britain's Chief of Imperial General Staff, 
Field Marshal Sir William Slim. The Council of Defence was an amalgam of leading 
cabinet members and Australia's top defence personnel, and it met with Slim to 
consider the gravity of the Cold War crisis and its implications for Australians. It 
was mid~century (almost exactly), some fifty years since Australian federation and 
eight years since the Japanese began their assault on Papua New Guinea, an attack 
that was seen as the greatest external threat yet to Australia. 
Slim wanted agreement from the Australians that Europe and the Middle East 
were the most crucial theatres to hold in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. 
More specifically, he wanted the Australians to agree to send an expeditionary 
force to help defend British airbases in the Middle East. Interestingly, he prompted 
something of a collective excursion into the history of Australia at war. Robert 
Menzies, prime minister said, 'The Middle East has been an Australian theatre now 
in two wars. We raised and sent the 2nd AIF to it and it was our primary 
preoccupation until Japan entered the war'. His Chief of General Staff, Sidney 
Rowell, added, 'We did right to help out in M[iddle] East in [the] last war, and [the] 
situation now resembles this'; while another cabinet member suggested that the 
situation was in fact 'more comparable to Ithe] first world war than to [thel 
secondo!. 
From the detailed notes taken of this meeting, Slim seemed both pleased and 
surprised at the historical turn the conversation took. He encouraged the 
Australians to assume that war with the Soviet Union would be global, and he 
pointedly reminded them of how the British empire might unravel should the 
Middle East not be held. If this happened, he said, 'it may open the route to Africa, 
finish cooperation by Pakistan and India, cut the sea route through the 
Mediterranean and deny to us oil resources which may be essential to the 
prosecution of this war.' Menzies agreed, adding that the Russians were also 
1 B. ROURKE's notes of Council of Defence Meeting, 21 June 1950, CRS M19711216. National 
Archives of Australia, Canberra (NMJ. 
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students of history: 'If they take note of the lessons of past history their aim must 
be to knock us out in the early period of the war'2. 
This episode illustrates well the paradigmatic problems historians of Australia 
in the world have faced. In the global crisis of the late 1940 to the early 19505, a 
crisis which resembled the beginning of a third world war according to Menzies, 
leading policy-makers were quick to think globally and to envisage their 
involvement in terms of global strategic dictates. When war comes, Australians get 
in ships and sail to the Middle East. They had done it in two previous world wars 
and in the early 1950s; they would agree to do so again. The events of the 1940s, 
including declarations of the new importance of the United States for security in 
the Pacific, and ratification of the Statute of Westminster (enacted in Britain in 
1931) conferring legal independence for Australia, had not disturbed the pattern of 
what Australians did when global war broke out. 
The June 1950 talks therefore present a problem for those who would chart 
ascendant nationalism or independence in Australia's international relations. For such 
commentators, it has to be an interregnum, an aberration or an imperial hangover in a 
story of progressive change for the better. But. as I argue further in this paper, it does 
not seem like an aberration. The big problem with the independence/nationalism line 
of inquiry is that it tends to appropriate the consequences of the two world wars 
through a selective blend of national sacrifice and highlighted moments of self-
consciousness. The soul-searching and shock reSUlting from more than 58 000 deaths 
in Europe and the Middle East in the first world war, when the population stood at a 
mere 5 million, and the prospect of a worst nightmare coming true in the second world 
war with the apparent likelihood of Japanese invasion, contains a tempting teleology. 
Australians must have grown more conscious of their distinctive national interests in 
the South Pacific, and more sensitive to changes in their region. 
The three main propositions in this paper suggest another way of viewing the 
history of Australia in international affairs. The first is that Australian policy-
makers were, from the moment of federation and even earlier, deeply interested in 
change in their region. Secondly, they were equally conscious that their security in 
their region depended on the fate of European empires in the global order, 
especially of course the British empire of which Australia was a proud member and 
which maintained the Royal Navy, Australians' main source of regional protection 
in the first half of the century. The third proposition is that the world wars, as 
interpreted by key Australian policy-makers, did not undermine this situation so 
much as throw it into even sharper relief. 
Australians and Their Region in the Global Order 
One the pioneers in the history of early Australian perceptions of and contacts 
with ASia, Neville Meaney, writes that the question of how to relate Europe to Asia 
2 Ibid. 
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was, from the start, the central issue in Australian foreign policy.3 Coping with Asia 
was a major theme from the outset even if the idea of engaging with Asia had a 
decidedly patchy history for much of the twentieth century. Australians, for 
example, insisted quickly on varying the dominant British nomenclature of the 'Far 
East' to account for their own perspective on the Asia~Pacific region. As historian 
David Walker has shown, constructive relations with Asia loomed as a nation~ 
building challenge for some Australian elites, and jostled with deep~seated fears 
that Asia's 'teeming millions' threatened white Australians' seemingly tenuous 
hold on their island~continent.4 Between 1909 and the outbreak of the second 
world war, prominent Australians ventured descriptions ranging from the 'Near 
East' and 'Far North' to the more apposite conflation, 'Near North', a description 
Prime Minister Menzies used in 1939 when the threat from Japan seemed 
imminent. 5 
At the same time, Australian ministers were always acutely sensitive to the 
global implications of their being part of the project that was the British empire. 
They were very conscious of the tension between far~flung imperial responsibilities 
and their own concrete needs for security in the Pacific. In 1910 Minister of Defence 
George Pearce reminded his fellow parliamentarians that while the British empire 
had long been Australians' source of protection, their connection with it entailed 
the possibility that they could, at any time, find themselves at war with an enemy 
who had no designs on Australia.6 Australian military contributions in the cause of 
empire was also an expectation that London promoted, stressing that it was only 
with the strongest empire effort that the Royal Navy would be able to carry out its 
many tasks. Imperial defence plans implied mutual help. The more unified the 
empire, the better able it was to protect distant frontiers. The consequences of a 
stretched empire for Australian defence was therefore one of the most worrying 
unknowns informing Australian foreign and defence policy for more than half of the 
century. 
Not surprisingly then, most of the Australian initiatives towards stronger 
regional defence before the first world war incorporated the empire. Instead of 
merely contributing financially to the maintenance of the Royal Navy, Prime 
Minister Alfred Deakin suggested the creation of an independent Australian navy 
and, more radically, the extension of the Monroe doctrine to the western Pacific. 
Australia's separate navy was born soon afterwards, but closer association with the 
Americans through an extended Monroe doctrine was an idea that sank quickly, if 
not completely. Importantly, both outcomes were very much the product of Anglo~ 
Australian negotiations. 7 
3 See MEANEY'S excellent introductory chapter in his Towards a New Vision: Australia & Japan 
through 100 Years, Sydney, 1999, pp. 9-36 
4 D. WALKER, Anxious Nation: Australia and the Rise of Asia. 1850-1939. Brisbane. 1999. 
5 N. MEANEY. 'Introduction: the Meaning of the Past'. in his edited collection, Australia and the 
World: A Documentary History from the 1870s to the 19705. Melbourne. 1985, p. 13. 
6 PEARCE, 18 August 1910. in ibid, p. 192. 
7 See D. LOWE, 'Australia in the World', in J. BEAUMONT (ed.). Australia's War 1914-18, Sydney, 
1995, pp. 127-28 
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The great problem for Australians during the first two decades of the century was that 
Britain was allied by treaty with Japan. the source of most Australian anxiety. This treaty 
was. according to Whitehall. intended in part to benefit Australia. It was meant to take the 
strain off the Royal Navy in its mammoth roving brief, thereby enabling it to be more 
effective when it counted. Instead. it probably prompted more Australian probing of 
imperial strategy than had it not been struck8 
At the end of the first world war. some Australians were still calling for a more 
generous Monroe dpctrine. and therefore more direct American involvement in 
Australian security.9 And later. in the mid to late ] 930s, Australians made a 
comprehensive case for a Pacific pact. linked to the League of Nations Charter and 
ideally involving the British, Americans, Japanese. Russians and other European 
powers such as France and the Netherlands. with strong interests in the region. 
The proposal was considered seriously in foreign capitols around the world but did 
not enjoy enough support to get off the ground. London's cool response was 
consistent with earlier British reactions to Australians venturing thoughts on 
improving their security in the Pacific: sympathetic. but knowing better. given the 
complexities of international politics at the time. 
There were some half-chances for Australians to promote regional thinking and 
become more involved in strengthening links with Asia and across the Pacific. The 
1930s was a period in which restrictive trading patterns and a depressed world 
economy stimulated forms of regionalism in East Asia. Japanese activity on the 
Asian mainland had a strong economic as well as a military dimension, the idea of 
the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere being fleshed out. and plans developed 
for its full realization. Not surprisingly. Australians had not such grand vision of 
regional trade, especially not a regionalism dominated by Japan. but they did enjoy 
healthy bilateral trade with Japan. Even this was sacrificed. though, when number 
one trading partner. Britain, seemed threatened. Between mid 1936 and early 1938 
the Australians imposed severe restrictions on Japanese imports (mainly textiles), 
and the other major trading nation bordering the Pacific, the United States (mainly 
motor chassis). In the case of Japan. the trade diversion was particularly short-
sighted. given that Australia enjoyed a very favourable balance of trade with Japan, 
which had in fact become the Australians' second best customer for major 
produce. British textiles exporters were the main beneficiaries. As one observer has 
put it. the policy amounted to sacrificing the interests of the second best customer 
in order to the protect those of the best customer. Britain, and hope for even more 
custom from Britain. ID 
It was only really in the late 1940s that an Australian government, the Labor 
government of Ben Chifley, gave serious thought to Australian involvement in 
regional cooperative diplomacy. This was made possible partly because the Chifley 
8 Ibid. 
9 For example, Prime Minister Billy Hughes in parliament. 10 September 1919: Commonwealth 
Parliarnentar!:l Debates, vol. LXXXIX, p. 12172. 
10 D. SISSONS, quoted in S. 'TWEEDLE, Trading Partners: Australia an.d Asia 1790-1993, Sydney. 1994, 
p.145. 
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government had watched closely and had become involved in Indonesia's bloody 
struggle for independence from the Dutch; and the government was ready to 
contemplate the ending of European empires in the region. There was also a 
personality factor. Chifley had struck up some rapport with Indian Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru during the complex negotiations leading .to India's retaining 
membership of the Commonwealth in 1949 while introducing a republican 
constitution. In the same year Australia sent representatives to an essentially 
regional meeting in New Delhi to discuss Indonesia and possibilities for further 
regional meetings. And just before Chifley lost office and the decade ticked over, 
his government was pondering ways of making helping make South East Asia a 
buffer between Australia and the rest of Asia through measures such as education 
and technical aid and other development-related assistance. II 
Two things curbed this line of thinking severely. the first being the arrival of a 
new Menzies government not as prepared as Labor to contemplate the region 
drained of civilising European influence; and the second was the re-emergence of 
world war as a dominant way of viewing change in world affairs. 
world Wars 
It is little wonder that the three world wars locked regional thinking into the 
most imperial and most global of gazes. Compared to previous wars, the first world 
war was of course extraordinary for its parameters - all of the major powers 
involved, and many of the smaller ones - its duration, its extravagant use of vast 
transport and weapons industries, its destruction of property. and the appalling 
loss of life, mostly European men, numbering nearly 10 million. Its magnitude left 
a deep imprint on the generation who lived through it. The war ended with the 
creation of the first codified international body designed to mediate disputes and 
uphold the rule of international law. Whatever its limitations as a source of 
collective security, the League was a fillip to an emerging internationalism which 
grew during the century through increasing activity across national boundaries in 
legal, humanitarian, economic and cultural spheres. 12 
The second world war involved even more nations. Air power now enabled more 
constant and easy transgression of national boundaries, and aerial bombardment 
and the concept of total war made mockery of the distinction between soldiers and 
citizens. Of the more than 50 million killed, at least half were civilians. Almost as 
many were uprooted as refugees in Europe, and not all were able to return to their 
pre-war homelands. Nazi ideology targeted Jews and Slavs, and in the case of Jews 
almost brought about their destruction as a group, with six million killed. The war 
ended with the creation of a world organization, the United Nations, intended to 
reform the international system that had allowed war to occur. It also ended with 
It D. LOWE, Menzies and tfle 'Great World Struggle', Sydney, 1999, pp. 36-7. 
12 See A. IRIYE, 'The International Order', in R. W. BULLlT (ed.), The Columbia History of the Twentieth 
Century, New York, 1998, pp. 229-47. 
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the dropping of two atomic bombs, signalling a new high point in space~time 
compression, an absurd level of disproportion between the use of weapons and 
human suffering, and the prospect of human self~destruction. 
The long Cold War bears few of the characteristics of the earlier world wars, 
save that, by mid 1950 at the latest, it was global in character. The early Cold War, 
however, from 1948 to 1952~53, was remarkable for how it was widely seen as the 
prelude to another world war. From 1948, Australians were treated to a stream of 
foreboding British analyses of the Soviet threat. The Chifley government tried to 
maintain a distinction between the Cold War polarity in Europe and more multi~ 
faceted problems in South East Asia, but the global logic of cold war was 
formidable, and was positively embraced by the Menzies government sworn at the 
end of 1949. By the middle months of 1950, both before and after the outbreak of 
the Korean war, leading British and American policy~makers began employing even 
more climactic metaphors, arguing that the time was fast approaching when had to 
take a stand and fight communism squarely. Menzies, as noted earlier, agreed.l3 
And Australian prime minister Menzies did more than merely speak in terms of 
history lessons. He doubled the defence budget as a percentage of domestic 
product, he introduced a big, expensive national service program for 18~year~0Id 
men, he led cabinet into agreeing to send troops and aircraft again to the Middle 
East when war broke out, and he commenced stockpiling and gearing the economy 
for war. 14 His Chief of General Staff made ambitious promises about how many 
troops would be available to travel to the Middle East on the basis that national 
service trainees had joined up in droves when the first world war had broken out. 
The trainees of the early I 950s would surely do the same. 15 
Australians fought in all three of these world wars, if we include, as a third, 
involvement in the Korean war and preparations to safeguard defence of the 
Middle East in the early 1950s. Leading Australian politicians saw the world wars 
as having huge implications not only for Western civilization but also for their own 
pocket of Western civilization trying to keep the uncivilised peoples out. Returning 
from a visit to Britain in 1916 Australian prime minister Billy Hughes reminded his 
countrymen and women that the mighty issues involved in the war would 
determine the future of the world, including Australia. He urged Australians to 
remember that they had sheltered from the horrors of the war beneath the 
'widestretched wings' of the British Navy, and told them to look again at their 
maps: 
So far from being far removed from the busy hive of men we live almost within hail of its 
greatest populations. We have nailed 'White Australia' to the top of the mast. Yet we are but 
a tiny drop in a coloured ocean. We are 5,000,000 of white people claiming to hold inviolate 
13 See LOWE, Menzies and tfle 'Great World Struggle', pp. 29~30, pp. 43~44. 
14 Ibid., pp. 80-99, pp. 128-151. 
15 Rowell memo for McBride, 'Citizen Military Forces - Survey', 28 February 1952, CRS A5954 
item 2291/4, NAA. 
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a great continent which would maintain 100,000,000 and we live almost within coo-ee of a 
thousand millions of coloured people, who jostle one another for want of room. 16 
Apart from his ugly racism, characteristic of many in the English-speaking world 
at the time, Hughes's warning highlighted existing key features of Australia in the 
world, Australians were constantly measuring British declarations about the Royal 
Navy's capabilities against what they, the Australians, thought they might be 
capable of when tested in several oceans at the same time. They were very 
practised. even before the first world war, at considering how wars might cross 
boundaries or have consequences for several spheres of influences. Global war 
accentuated this global-regional interdependence rather than transforming 
Australians' concepts of international power and competition. 
This was also the case in Australian anticipations of world war. Australians were 
amongst the keenest appeasers of Germany and Japan during the second half of 
the 1930s. Senior politicians and advisers had studied Hitler's rise to power 
carefully and had been divided over whether revision of the Treaty of Versailles 
would satisfy the new Germany. By late 1937 most felt that dealing with Hitler 
would have to involve either substantial territorial concessions, at the expense of 
central Europe, or rearmament and declarations of intent to take up arms. It was 
the appeasers, led by Prime Minister Joe Lyons and then Attorney-General 
Menzies, who won out in Australian debates. In the months leading up to the 
Munich agreement of September 1938 the Australian cabinet moved quickly to 
separate the Sudetenland issue from the bigger issue of Czechoslovakia and other 
international problems, and to petition London that the Czechs did not warrant 
going to war. After war with Germany had been declared, the Menzies government 
was similarly most reluctant to provoke Japan into aggression, pressuring London 
to keep closed the Burma Road that supplied Chinese nationalists, and declining 
to make significant reductions in exports to Japan well into 1941. 17 For a time, 
Australian appeasement was amongst the most fear-driven, informed by a 
panicked guess at how quickly global war with several main fronts could bring 
unstuck plans for the Royal Navy to protect Australia's north, 
There is no equivalent of appeasement in the Menzies' government of the early 
1950s. On the contrary, like many others in Western capitals, the Australian policy-
making elite was hypersensitive to any allegations of appeasement of the new 
threat, the Soviet Union and its communist satellites. Memories of Manchuria and 
Munich were close to the surface of Australian discussions with Slim in 1950. 
Menzies, however, was also most sensitive to the possibility of a war even more 
global than the two before it stretching the democracies' resources across even 
more theatres. Having visited Britain, the United States, Korea and Japan shortly 
16 HUGHES'S speech, Melbourne Town Hall, 14 August 1916, in MEANEY (ed.), Australia and the 
World, p. 236. 
17 F. CAIN, The Pacific War: Why did the Menzies Government Not See it Coming?', in F. CAIN 
(ed.), Menzies in Warand Peace, Sydney, 1997, pp. 1-23. 
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after the outbreak of the Korean war, he noted in his diary another historically 
informed interpretation of communist activity in Korea and other parts of Asia: 
All these Asian adventures are diversions by the Russians 
(a) to contain substantial democratic forces 
(b) to create a psychology which will make countries like Australia unwilling to make 
commitment outside S.£. Asia 
(c) to try out weapons and techniques first as in the Spanish civil war. IS 
In the wake of these thoughts, Menzies urged the British and Americans to 
resist Stalin's invitations to spread their defence resources thinly in response to 
the several communist-led crises. He wanted them to choose between those areas 
that were vita I a nd worth defendi ng, and those that were not. /9 The idea of 
preserving the empire's military forces, and now also American forces, in order to 
best safeguard Australia's own regional security was as strong as ever. 
Occasionally, both sides of Australian politics suggested some capacity for 
Australians to look after themselves, some measure of self-sufficiency in Australian 
defence. Labor leaders in opposition promoted big spending on air power in the 
late 1930s as a move designed to conquer geography and provide a defensive 
screen for the great island continent. Conservatives indulged in the same wishful 
thinking. A few weeks after the declaration of war in September 1939 Prime 
Minister Menzies told the public that they must keep two great questions in mind: 
'What must we do in Australia to protect ourselves against a danger of attack in our 
own waters or on our own shores? Having made all proper provisions for that, in 
what way can we best contribute to the victory of Great Britain?'20. No amount of 
grammatical construction could hide the fact though, that it was only through 
British victories or American intervention that the Australians would be adequately 
defended under their current defence provisions. 
Occasionally also, Australians led the way in Australian~British involvement in 
the South East Asian region. During the latter half of the second world war John 
Curtin's Labor government spoke ambitiously and even took some action to give 
Australia a more prominent role in the local region at the end of the war. In 
addition to rather grandiose musings about assuming the mantle of European 
empires destined to withdraw from South East Asia, the Australians struck an 
agreement with New Zealand at the beginning of 1944 to promote their interests in 
the region. The so~called 'ANZAC Agreement' was bold, bordering on belligerent in 
its declarations that Australia and New Zealand had to be parties to any peace in 
the Pacific, and that they refused to recognise any change in sovereignty in the 
region as a result of allied use of bases during the war, a clause aimed especially at 
the United States. The agreement arose through a mixture of local imperialism and 
imagined power vacuums in the post~war Pacific, frustration at having been 
ignored in the making of key allied decisions in the latter half of the war, and a 
18 Diary entry, 10 July 1950, Menzies Papers, MS4936, box 397, Canberra. 
19 LOWE, Menzies and ti1e 'Great World Struggle', pp. 64-65. 
20 MENZIES' comment of 27 September 1939, in MEANEY (ed), Australia in the World, p. 462. 
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sense of new opportunity as representatives of the British Commonwealth in the 
South Pacific. Curtin said that it served a 'global idea', stressing that Australia and 
New Zealand had had imposed on them 'for all time to come, the great associated 
role of trusteeship in the South Pacific'21. It was a global idea which suffered from 
another dose of wishful thinking about Australia's capacities as a military power, 
and which still had a line thrown to Britain for support. The Americans were 
unimpressed. as were those European powers, such as Portugal and the 
Netherlands, whose colonies seemed to be in the Australians' sights. As a result, 
the ANZAC Agreement did not enjoy support overseas. 22 
And in the third world war, in 1951, Australians' long~sought Pacific pact was 
finally achieved in the form of the ANZUS Treaty, a security treaty between 
Australia, New Zealand and the United States. Having often been described as the 
cornerstone of Australian foreign policy since its inception, and also the great 
symbol of Australia's 'turn' away from Britain towards the United States, ANZUS 
has attracted a lot of historical attention. Very rarely, however, has its correct 
context, that of the war~like planning of the early 1950s, been adequately 
appreciated.23 What is clear is that, despite some clumsy diplomacy and some 
British bristling at being excluded from this pact, both London and Washington 
saw its main value in the context of how it related to the global crisis. As the 
British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations told Menzies in 1951: 
We completely accept your thesis that it is essential for your back door to be bolted. A 
guarantee lof your security I by the United States would make a significant contribution to 
the strengthening of our joint plans for global strategy and for the defence of the Middle 
East, which [ know from our recent talks in London is so much on your mind. 24 
Importantly, the Americans viewed ANZUS in the same way: providing the 
Australians with the security guarantee that would enable them to send forces 
overseas to help in areas of global significance, such as the Middle East.25 
Whatever its status would become in future years, ANZUS was, at the time of its 
drafting, another example of a regional security measure tied inextricably to global 
imperatives and the role of Australia in imperial defence planning. 
It was not until the mid~ 1950s that the idea of a long cold war replaced 
expectations of a likely 'hot' one. This slow transition paved the way for harder 
21 Curtin, 21 January 1944, in ibid., pp. 492~3. 
22 See D. DAY, 'Dr H.V. Evatt and the Search for a Sub~empire in the Southwest Pacific', in D. 
DAY (ed.), Brave New World: Dr H.v. Evatt and Australian Foreign Policy 1941-1949, St Lucia, 1996, pp. 
47-61. 
23 An example which does not adequately cover the global context of ANZUS is C. BELL, 
Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy, Melbourne, 1988; and a more detailed study which 
incorporates the global strategic setting is W.D. MCiNTYRE, Background to the Anzus Pact: Policy~ 
Making, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1945-55, New York, 1995. 
24 P. GORDON WALKER to MENZIES', 13 March 1951. no. 238, F0371/92072, F1072120G, London. 
25 O. BRADLEY (Chairman US Joint Chiefs of Staff) to MARSHALL (Secretary of Defense), 9 July 
1951, RG 59, 790.517-2051, United States National Archives, Washington DC; Joint Chiefs 
memorandum for Secretary of Defense (Lovett). 'The Military Role of Australia and New Zealand', 
28 December 1951. RG 330 box 265, CD 337, USNA. 
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thinking in Australia about the consequences of past and likely future 
decolonization in South East Asia and the Pacific.26 It did not mean the end of 
interdependence between security in a regional context and involvement in British 
and American global strategy. Such interdependence has never disappeared. The 
transition was also far from smooth, as was well illustrated by the Menzies 
government's strident support for Britain during the Suez crisis of 1956. A crisis in 
the Middle East in which British and French interests were at stake triggered a 
default setting in government for Australian rallying to preserve the imperial 
lifeline, the sea-lines between Britain and Australia. But without an overpowering 
anticipation of another world war there was more space to think constructively, 
from the second half of the 19505, about Australian involvement in its region. 
Conclusion 
The term 'independence' did not loom large in Australians' notions of their 
foreign policies in the first half of the twentieth century. This has not stopped 
historians from spreading considerable ink on the matter of Australian dependence 
and independence - admittedly more in titles and structural architecture than as 
incisive analytical approaches. Most of these studies have obscured the fact that 
constant tension between and interdependence of globalism and regional security 
concerns was present from the outset, and Australia's involvement in the world 
wars of the first half of the century confirmed rather changed this. 
One of the implications of my interpretation here is that there is, in the 
Australian case study, plenty of support for Eric Hobsbawm's comment that there 
is no understanding of the world since 1914 without understanding the impact of 
world war. The twentieth century, he argues, 'lived and thought in terms of world 
war, even when the guns were silent and the bombs were not exploding.27, 
Hobsbawm discusses the two world wars in one chapter on total war, and other 
historians have linked them through the idea of a thirty years war.28 If the 
Australian experience can contribute to the bigger project of structuring the history 
of international relations, there may even be a case of extending the continuous 
war idea to forty years - or perhaps employ the metaphor of a triptych, 10 deal 
adequately with the special circumstances of the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
The New Zealand experience might illustrate the same pOint. Space does not 
permit a detailed comparison here, but it is worth noting that the greater 
geographical remove from Asia enabled New Zealanders to respond even more 
deCisively than Australians to the global/imperial dictates of three world wars. In 
the first world war, they went a step further than the Australians and introduced 
conscription for military service; in the second world war they were quicker to send 
26 This is one of the main arguments in LOWE, Menzies and the 'Great World Struggle'. 
27 E. HOBSBAWM, Age of Extremes, London, 1995, p. 22. 
28 As discussed, for example, P.M.H. BELL, The Origins of the Second World War in Europe, Harlow, 
1986, pp. 14-52. 
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troopS to the Middle East, and inclined to leave them there after Japan's entry into 
the war; and in 1950-51 they )'Iere faster and unconditional in confirming their role 
in sending another expeditionary force to help the Commonwealth defend the 
Middle East if and when needed.29 
Less ambitiously, we can conclude that the history lesson played out in 
Canberra in June 1950 was testament to the globalism of the two world wars. Here, 
some clarification of terminology might be made. 'Globalization', in its relatively 
un~theorised form of space-time compression and increasing interconnectedness, 
was also something that the two world wars promoted. For reasons outlined in this 
paper, Australians tended to be very sensitive to forces which made the world 
seem more interconnected, and which might affect the Royal Navy's capacity to 
save them from invasion. They were sensitive to revolutions in technology and 
communications and challenges to the imperial world order. The work and life 
span of the Australian Council of Defence provide some illustration of this. Its June 
1950 meeting with Slim was the last but one before the council was disbanded, 
and its first meeting had been in May 1905, coincident with the stunning Japanese 
demolition of the Russian Baltic fleet in the Tsushima Straits. 
In relation to the key themes of our focus on globalization and regionalization, 
the Australian experience in the first half of the twentieth century suggests that 
globalism was a more central idea than globalization. The ongoing process implied in 
the term 'globalization' is not as important in explaining the early 1950s Cold War 
episode as the globalist mindset: the interpretation of economic and foreign policy 
in relation to events and developments throughout the world. Australian 
federation occurred at the beginning of the century, at a time when the British 
empire was near its peak of expansion. Federated Australia was therefore born 
thinking global, even if it was global via empire. 
We can safely say that globalization during the twentieth century also assisted 
in Australians' capacity to think in regional terms. South East Asia and the Pacific 
underwent changes that owed much to shifts in world power and the changing 
nature of the world economy. But there were also two more specific processes that 
facilitated Australians' closer engagement with their region in the second half of 
the century. One was the slow, complicated end of the far-flung British empire and 
Australians' identification with it, and the other was the erosion of strong 
expectations in another world war. With respect to the latter, the Australian case 
study suggests that changing strategic circumstances and also the ageing of a 
generation of policy~makers led by experience to expect global struggle were both 
necessary. As the 1960s wore on, there grew fewer cabinet colleagues and public 
servants with whom one could sit down and reminisce about what we had done in 
the last war and how this would guide Australia in the next one. 
29 On these themes, see MCiNTYRE:, Background to the ANZUS Pact. 
